The relation between monotonicity and strategy-proofness
The relation between monotonicity and strategy-proofness
复制标题
单调性与策略证明性之间的关系
DOI：
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发表时间：
2013
影响因子：
0.9
通讯作者：
Olivier Bochet
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
B. Klaus;Olivier Bochet
Muller-Satterthwaite Theorem（J Econ Theory 14：412-418，1977）建立了Maskin单调性和防策略性之间的等价性，这是社会选择规则分散化的两个基石条件。我们考虑一个一般模型，它既包括穆勒-萨特思韦特（Muller-Satterthwaite，J Econ Theory，14：412-418，1977）中的公共产品经济，也包括私人产品经济。对于私人物品经济，我们使用比马斯金单调性更弱的条件，我们称之为单边单调性。我们引入了两个易于检验的偏好域条件，它们分别保证（i）单边/Maskin单调性蕴含防策略性（定理1）和（ii）防策略性蕴含单边/Maskin单调性（定理2）。我们介绍并讨论了各种经典的单峰偏好域，并展示了它们满足的域条件（见命题1和2以及表1中的概述）。作为我们分析的副产品，我们得到了Muller-Satterthwaite定理的一些扩展，如定理3所总结的。我们还讨论了一些新的“Muller-Satterthwaite偏好域”（例如，提案3）。
The Muller–Satterthwaite Theorem (J Econ Theory 14:412–418, 1977) establishes the equivalence between Maskin monotonicity and strategy-proofness, two cornerstone conditions for the decentralization of social choice rules. We consider a general model that covers public goods economies as in Muller–Satterthwaite (J Econ Theory 14:412–418, 1977) as well as private goods economies. For private goods economies, we use a weaker condition than Maskin monotonicity that we call unilateral monotonicity. We introduce two easy-to-check preference domain conditions which separately guarantee that (i) unilateral/Maskin monotonicity implies strategy-proofness (Theorem 1) and (ii) strategy-proofness implies unilateral/Maskin monotonicity (Theorem 2). We introduce and discuss various classical single-peaked preference domains and show which of the domain conditions they satisfy (see Propositions 1 and 2 and an overview in Table 1). As a by-product of our analysis, we obtain some extensions of the Muller–Satterthwaite Theorem as summarized in Theorem 3. We also discuss some new “Muller–Satterthwaite preference domains” (e.g., Proposition 3).