The cognitive representation of genetic engineering:: knowledge and evaluations
The cognitive representation of genetic engineering:: knowledge and evaluations
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DOI：
10.1080/713687603
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发表时间：
2000-12-01
影响因子：
1.8
通讯作者：
Jungermann, H
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Pfister, HR;Böhm, G;Jungermann, H
公众对基因工程的看法是怀疑和矛盾的。这一点尤其适用于德国，但也适用于大多数其他欧洲国家。过去几年的大量研究证实了这一点(Kliment&Renn，1993)。无论是含蓄的还是明确的，科学界或产业界的成员都倾向于指责知识不足是这种“缺乏”接受的原因。他们认为，更广泛的基因工程知识将导致更好的理解，从而更好地被接受。因此，应该更加重视对这一领域的人的教育。到目前为止，这一论点与其他任何东西一样，都是一种假设或希望。基因工程的支持者并不是唯一持有这种观点的人：反对者也确信，更广泛的知识将使人们成为他们事业的支持者。因此，他们也把希望寄托在教育和教育上。两个阵营都认为，基因工程的知识和评估是有联系的，人们对基因工程的看法取决于他们对它的了解程度。他们认为，你知道的越多，你就会成为越强大的支持者或反对者。对这种因果关系的信任真的是正当的吗？在本研究中，我们试图回答这个问题。我们调查了一个有代表性的受试者样本，了解他们对基因工程及其不同用途的了解情况，以及他们对基因工程的看法，以及他们的知识和评估之间的关系。我们对受试者的事实知识或他们对具体问题的回答(例如，什么是基因组分析？或你发现基因组分析是好事还是坏事？)不那么感兴趣。而是知识和评价的认知结构和表征。我们试图特别回答的是：知识和评估是形成认知上连贯的结构，还是它们的认知表现往往是不连贯的、零散的和没有联系的？仅凭直接调查方法，这个问题是不可能回答的。相反，我们使用了间接的有条不紊的方法。
Public opinion of genetic engineering is marked by scepticism and ambivalence. This holds true for Germany in particular, but for most other European countries, too. A large number of studies have confi rmed this over the past years (Kliment & Renn, 1993). Implicitly or explicitly, members of the scientific community or the industry tend to accuse inadequate knowledge of being the cause for this ‘lack’of acceptance. More extensive knowledge of genetic engineering would, so they argue, lead to a better understanding and hence to greater acceptance. A greater emphasis should therefore be put on educating people in this area.Up until now, this thesis is an assumption or hope as much as anything else. Proponents of genetic engineering are not alone in holding this view: opponents, too, are confi dent that more extensive knowledge will make people supporters of their cause. Hence, they too put their hopes in educating and informing people. Both camps assume that knowledge and evaluations of genetic engineering are connected, that the way people view genetic engineering is determined by how much they know about it. The more you know, they argue, the stronger a proponent or an opponent you will become. Is the trust in such a causal relation really justifi ed? We tried to answer this question in the present study. We examined a representative sample of subjects as to what they knew—and about what they thought they knew—about genetic engineering and its different uses, about what they thought about it, and about the relationship between their knowledge and evaluations. We were less interested in the subjects’ factual knowledge or their responses to specifi c questions (such as ‘What is genome analysis?’or ‘Do you fi nd genome analysis a good or a bad thing?’) but rather in the cognitive structure and representation of knowledge and evaluations. What we were trying to answer in particular was this: do knowledge and evaluations form cognitively coherent structures, or does their cognitive representation tend to be incoherent, fragmentary and unconnected? On the basis of direct survey methods alone, this question is impossible to answer. We have used an indirect methodical approach instead.