Testing the Global Financial Transparency Regime
Testing the Global Financial Transparency Regime
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测试全球金融透明度制度
DOI：
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发表时间：
2011
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
J. Sharman
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
J. Sharman
我们如何判断理论上适用的规则在实践中是否真的适用呢？现实主义者认为，在国际层面上，正式规则所禁止的内容与其有效性之间的差距可能特别大。此外，占主导地位的国家可能会将它们自己选择不实施的代价高昂的标准强加给其他国家。为了检验这些命题，文章评估了禁止匿名参与全球金融体系的国际软法标准的有效性，试图打破这些标准。调查结果表明，对匿名公司的禁令相对无效，在七国集团国家比在避税港更容易受到藐视。本文对现实主义学者在国际政治经济学中的工作做出了贡献和扩展，他们对正式规则的怀疑和对权力影响的关注都是如此。证据来自提交人从22个国家的45家公司服务提供商那里招揽和购买匿名空壳公司的情况。
How can we tell whether rules that apply in theory actually do so in practice? Realists argue that the gap between what formal rules proscribe and their effectiveness may be particularly wide at the international level. Furthermore, dominant states may impose costly standards on others that they themselves choose not to implement. To test these propositions, the article assesses the effectiveness of international soft law standards prohibiting anonymous participation in the global financial system by seeking to break these standards. The findings indicate that the prohibition on anonymous corporations is relatively ineffective and is flouted much more in G7 countries than in tax havens. The article contributes to and extends the work of realist scholars in international political economy, both in their skepticism of formal rules and focus on the effects of power. Evidence is drawn from the author's solicitations and purchases of anonymous shell companies from 45 corporate service providers in 22 countries.