Analyst Behavior and Underwriter Choice
Analyst Behavior and Underwriter Choice
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分析师行为和承销商选择
DOI：
10.1007/s11146-010-9246-3
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发表时间：
2011
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Crocker H. Liu
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
W. Boudry;J. Kallberg;Crocker H. Liu
我们使用美国主要投资银行的样本来研究分析师在公司选择承销商中所扮演的角色。为了最好地捕捉竞争环境（这对分析师发挥的潜在作用至关重要），我们将公司样本限制为 161 家在 1996 年至 2004 年间发行债务或股权的房地产投资信托基金 (REIT)。 （Journal of Finance 61:301–340 2006）在考虑了分析师行为的内生性和承保范围自选决策的情况下，我们发现相对于竞争对手的目标价格乐观的目标价格会显着增加承销商吸引承销业务的可能性。这一结果适用于费用超过 100 万美元的股权和债务发行。我们还发现了与以下观点相一致的证据：加强对分析师和投资银行之间利益冲突的监管审查，降低了分析师行为对承销商选择的影响。
We examine the role that analysts play in a firm's choice of underwriter using a sample of major U.S. investment banks. In order to best capture the competitive environment, which is critical to the potential role that analysts play, we limit our sample of firms to 161 real estate investment trusts (REITs) issuing debt or equity between 1996 and 2004. Using the estimation technique of Ljungqvist et al. (Journal of Finance 61:301–340 2006), which accounts for the endogeneity of analyst behavior and the coverage self-selection decision, we find that target prices that are optimistic relative to competitors' target prices, significantly increase an underwriter's probability of attracting underwriting business. This result holds for both equity and debt issues with fees greater than one million dollars. We also find evidence consistent with the notion that increased regulatory scrutiny of conflicts of interest between analysts and investment banks has decreased the impact of analyst behavior on underwriter choice.
DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.247435
发表时间：
1999-03
期刊：
Financial Accounting
影响因子：
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作者：
Eli Bartov;Dan Givoly;Carla K. Hayn
通讯作者：
Eli Bartov;Dan Givoly;Carla K. Hayn