Threats to privacy in the forensic analysis of database systems
Threats to privacy in the forensic analysis of database systems
复制标题
数据库系统取证分析中的隐私威胁
DOI：
10.1145/1247480.1247492
复制
发表时间：
2007
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
B. Levine
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Patrick Stahlberg;G. Miklau;B. Levine
任何现代计算机系统的使用都会留下过期数据和用户过去活动的残留物的意外痕迹。在本文中，我们研究了存储在数据库系统中的数据的意外持久性。这些数据可以通过法医分析来恢复，并且对隐私构成威胁。
首先，我们展示了数据残余如何保存在数据库表存储、事务日志、索引和其他系统组件中。我们对几个真实的数据库系统的评估表明，删除的数据不能安全地从数据库存储中删除，用户对删除数据的持久性几乎没有控制权。
其次，我们提出了一套系统透明度标准，以解决意外的数据保留的问题：数据保留应尽可能避免，明显的用户时，它不能避免，并在时间上有界。
第三，我们提出了安全的记录删除和日志删除，增加数据库系统的透明度，使他们更耐法医分析的具体技术。
The use of any modern computer system leaves unintended traces of expired data and remnants of users' past activities. In this paper, we investigate the unintended persistence of data stored in database systems. This data can be recovered by forensic analysis, and it poses a threat to privacy.
First, we show how data remnants are preserved in database table storage, the transaction log, indexes, and other system components. Our evaluation of several real database systems reveals that deleted data is not securely removed from database storage and that users have little control over the persistence of deleted data.
Second, we address the problem of unintended data retention by proposing a set of system transparency criteria: data retention should be avoided when possible, evident to users when it cannot be avoided, and bounded in time.
Third, we propose specific techniques for secure record deletion and log expunction that increase the transparency of database systems, making them more resistant to forensic analysis.