How Are A Priori Truths Possible
How Are A Priori Truths Possible
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先验真理如何可能
DOI：
10.1111/j.1468-0378.1993.tb00031.x
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发表时间：
1993
影响因子：
0.9
通讯作者：
C. Peacocke
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
C. Peacocke
由于看到试图穿越同一地形的其他车辆的残骸而感到有些恐惧，我将尝试回答先验真理如何可能的问题。这个问题在本世纪得到了两种截然不同的答案。一种是采用某种形式的传统主义，这种传统主义或多或少有激进的变体。另一个备受讨论的答案可以在蒯因的观点中找到。我怀疑当今许多哲学家不愿意毫无保留地认可这两个答案中的任何一个。本文的目的是提出第三种理论，旨在解决我们继承的问题。有一个先验的特征已经成为标准。标准表征表明，如果一个真理在现实世界中独立于任何特定类型的经验或经验信息而被认为是真实的，那么它就是先验的。这种标准的描述非常需要澄清，以至于对我刚才描述的议程的自然反应是想知道，首先确定先验真理的存在甚至可能性是否不是更明智的做法。查尔斯·帕森斯（Charles Parsons）评论道“今天的读者至少会准备好接受先验知识的概念要么是无可救药地不清楚要么是空洞的”（Parsons 1992，第 62-3 页），这可能会被许多人认为是外交辞令。然而，还有其他例子表明，对某些有争议的事物类型的起源和性质提供可信的理论解释对于使该类型的实例化变得合理至关重要。（在对黑洞的可能性进行理论解释之前，没有人会相信黑洞的存在。）因此，我要求那些对我的议程条款持怀疑态度的人至少暂停他们的怀疑，直到我们得到积极的解释。事实上，我将使用积极的解释来生成先验的特征，这是对标准定义的补充，并且旨在更具解释性。
With some trepidation caused by the sight of the wreckage of the other vehicles which have attempted to cross the same terrain, I will attempt to give an answer to the question of how a priori truths are possible. The question has received two distinctive kinds of answer in this century. One kind consists in the adoption of some form of conventionalism, which comes in more or less radical varieties. The other much—discussed answer is found in the views of Quine. My suspicion is that many present-day philosophers would be reluctant to endorse either of these two answers without serious reservations. The purpose of this paper is to present a third theory, which aims to address our inherited question. There is a characterization of the a priori which has become standard. The standard characterization states that a truth is a priori if it can be known to be true in the actual world independently of any particular kind of experience or empirical information. This standard characterization is in such need of clarification that a natural reaction to the agenda I just described is to wonder whether it might not be wiser first to establish the existence or even the possibility of a priori truths. Charles Parsons would probably be regarded by many as diplomatic in commenting that” a reader of today would be prepared at least to entertain the idea that the notion of a priori knowledge is either hopelessly unclear or vacuous”(Parsons 1992, pp. 62-3). There are, however, other examples in which providing a credible theoretical account of the origins and nature of some disputed type of thing is crucial to making it plausible that the type is instantiated.(No one would believe in the existence of black holes prior to having a theoretical explanation of their possibility.) So I ask those who are sceptical about the very terms of my agenda at least to suspend their scepticism until the positive account is before us. I will in fact use the positive account to generate a characterization of the a priori which is additional to the standard definition, and which aims to be somewhat more explanatory.