Social Welfare under Quantity Competition and Price Competition in a Mixed Duopoly with Network Effects: An Analysis
Social Welfare under Quantity Competition and Price Competition in a Mixed Duopoly with Network Effects: An Analysis
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DOI：
10.4236/tel.2013.34035
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发表时间：
2013-07
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Yasuhiko Nakamura
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Yasuhiko Nakamura
松村和小川(2012)在最近的工作中指出，在混合双寡头垄断的背景下，定价竞争中的均衡社会福利高于数量竞争中的均衡社会福利。我们发现，当网络效应的强度足够高时，上述结果完全相反；因此，在混合双寡头垄断中，网络效应的存在削弱了定价竞争相对于均衡社会福利的优势。
In their recent work, Matsumura and Ogawa (2012) showed that in the context of a mixed duopoly, equilibrium social welfare is higher in price-setting competition than in quantity-setting competition. We found that when the strength of network effects is sufficiently high, the above result is totally reversed; thus, in a mixed duopoly, the presence of network effects weakens the superiority of price-setting competition with respect to equilibrium social welfare.