A Game-Theoretic Model for Aggregate Lane Choice Behavior of Highway Mainline Vehicles at the Vicinity of On-ramps
A Game-Theoretic Model for Aggregate Lane Choice Behavior of Highway Mainline Vehicles at the Vicinity of On-ramps
复制标题
入口匝道附近公路干线车辆总体车道选择行为的博弈论模型
DOI：
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发表时间：
2020
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
R. Horowitz
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Ruolin Li;Jiaxi Liu;R. Horowitz
高速公路入口匝道被认为是现代交通系统中一种典型的可能导致拥堵的交通场景。入口匝道车辆需要并入主线交通，而主线上的直通车辆打算以最小的努力穿过潜在的合并区域。在最接近入口匝道的车道上行驶的主线通过车辆，为了尽量减少自己的努力，要么在最外面的车道上保持稳定并准备与入口匝道车辆合并，要么他们改变到离入口匝道更远的车道并绕过潜在的合并区域。众所周知，车道变换选择很难建模，并且自私的车辆可能会迫使匝道车辆采取危险的合并机动，然后危及高速公路的安全和效率。在这项工作中，我们模拟的总车道选择行为的高速公路主线车辆面临的坡道前进。我们提出了一个模型的成本，在高速公路主线上的车辆评估时，他们选择在附近的匝道车道。假设所有的车辆选择自己的车道自私，我们模型的主线车辆作为Wardrop均衡的总车道选择行为。我们证明了平衡点的存在性和唯一性。然后，我们验证我们的模型使用微尺度交通仿真数据。此外，我们模型干线车辆的社会最优车道选择行为。研究结果表明，如果鼓励主线车辆转向远离入口匝道的相邻车道，为入口匝道车辆留出更多的空间，社会交通状况将得到改善。
Highway on-ramps are regarded as a typical traffic scenario that may lead to congestion in modern transportation systems. On-ramp vehicles need to merge into the mainline traffic whereas through vehicles on the mainline intend to travel across the potential merging area with the least effort. Mainline through vehicles on the lane closest to the on-ramp, to minimize their own effort, either stay steadfast on this outermost lane and prepare to merge with on-ramp vehicles, or they change to a lane further from the on-ramp and bypass the potential merging area. The lane-changing choice is known to be difficult to model and through vehicles acting selfishly may force on-ramp vehicles to take dangerous merging maneuvers and then compromise the safety and efficiency of the highway. In this work, we model the aggregate lane choice behavior of highway mainline vehicles facing on-ramps ahead. We propose a model for the costs that the vehicles on the highway mainline evaluate when they choose their lanes at the vicinity of on-ramps. Assuming all vehicles choose their lanes selfishly, we model the resulting aggregate lane choice behavior of the mainline vehicles as a Wardrop equilibrium. We prove that the equilibrium exists and is unique. We then validate our model using micro-scale traffic simulation data. Moreover, we model mainline vehicles’ socially optimal lane choice behavior. We conclude that the social traffic conditions will be improved if mainline vehicles are encouraged to steer to an adjacent lane further from the on-ramp and give away more space to on- ramp vehicles.