Close-Out Netting, Insolvency Law and Conflict of Laws
Close-Out Netting, Insolvency Law and Conflict of Laws
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净额清算、破产法和法律冲突
DOI：
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发表时间：
2014
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
P. Paech
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
P. Paech
平仓净额结算是金融机构使用的一种风险缓解工具。它相当于抵销，其对破产的影响大致相当于超优先级。因此，它可能与平等通过原则相冲突。许多法域已经解决了这一冲突，并对其法律进行了调整，使结清净额结算即使在破产的情况下也可以强制执行。然而，由于金融市场是全球性的，当事人、其分支机构和资产可能位于不同的法域。然而，各国未能就协调一致的法律冲突规则达成一致，尽管它们决定不在2013年统一私法协会关于净额结算条款的运作的原则中纳入法律冲突原则，尽管它们显然需要这样做。相关的欧盟法律虽然不完善，但已经解决了这一担忧。这篇文章指出了潜在的概念困难，并为改善欧盟和其他金融市场的框架提出了解决方案。
Close-out netting is a risk mitigation tool used by financial institutions. It is comparable to set-off and its effects in insolvency are loosely comparable to a super-priority. Therefore, it might conflict with the pari passu principle. Many jurisdictions have solved that conflict and adapted their laws so that close-out netting is enforceable even in the event of insolvency. However, as the financial market is global, the parties, their branches and assets might be located in different jurisdictions. Nevertheless, countries failed to agree on a harmonised conflict-of-laws rule, despite the obvious need, when they decided not to include a conflict-of-laws principle in the 2013 Unidroit Principles on the operation of close-out netting provisions. The relevant EU law, though patchy, already addresses this concern. This article identifies the underlying conceptual difficulties and proposes a solution for an improved framework for both the EU and other financial marketplaces.