How Committees of Experts Interact with the outside World: Some Theory, and Evidence from the Fomc
How Committees of Experts Interact with the outside World: Some Theory, and Evidence from the Fomc
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专家委员会如何与外界互动：一些理论和联邦公开市场委员会的证据
DOI：
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发表时间：
2008
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
B. Visser
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
J. Swank;O. Swank;B. Visser
一些委员会由专家组成，这些专家既关心手头的事情，也关心给人留下有能力的决策者的印象。我们表明，这些委员会希望向公众隐瞒分歧。也就是说，一旦做出决定，他们就向外界展示了统一战线。此外，如果要求这些委员会变得透明，例如，通过公布其会议的逐字记录，成员将在公众视线之外组织会议前的会议。这篇文章的很大一部分是致力于美国联邦公开市场委员会的案例研究。它提供了支持我们理论的提示性证据。(JEL：D71、D72、D82、E58)(C)欧洲经济协会2008年。
Some committees are made up of experts, persons who care both about the matter at hand and about coming across as able decision makers. We show that such committees would like to conceal disagreement from the public. That is, once the decision has been reached, they show a united front to the outside world. Also, if such committees are required to become transparent, for example, by publishing verbatim transcripts of their meetings, members will organize pre-meetings away from the public eye. A large part of the article is dedicated to a case study of the U.S. Federal Open Market Committee in the United States. It provides suggestive evidence supporting our theory. (JEL: D71, D72, D82, E58) (c) 2008 by the European Economic Association.