Are CEOs and CFOs Rewarded for Disclosure Quality
Are CEOs and CFOs Rewarded for Disclosure Quality
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DOI：
10.2308/accr-50885
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发表时间：
2015-05
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Kai Wai Hui;Steven R. Matsunaga
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Kai Wai Hui;Steven R. Matsunaga
摘要：本研究通过考察首席执行官和首席财务官的薪酬是否与公司财务披露的质量相关，提供了关于董事会对与投资者群体有效沟通的重要性的证据。使用分析师预测特征和管理层预测准确性得出的指数来衡量披露质量，我们发现首席执行官和首席财务官的年度奖金变化与披露质量的变化呈正相关。我们还发现，对于高增长企业、治理结构更强的企业以及股权激励较低的高管来说，这种关系更为紧密。总体而言，我们的研究结果让我们深入了解了董事会将与投资者进行有效沟通作为首席执行官和首席财务官的责任的重要性，因此为他们提供了合同激励，以解决与自愿披露相关的道德风险问题。 JEL 分类：M41。
ABSTRACT: This study provides evidence regarding the importance that boards of directors place on effective communication with the investor community by examining whether CEO and CFO compensation are related to the quality of the firm's financial disclosures. Using an index derived from analyst forecast characteristics and management forecast accuracy to measure disclosure quality, we find changes in the annual bonus for both the CEO and CFO to be positively associated with changes in disclosure quality. We also find that the relation is stronger for high-growth firms, firms that have stronger governance structures, and for executives with lower equity incentives. Overall, our findings provide insight into the importance that boards place on effective communication with investors as a responsibility of the CEO and CFO and, therefore, provide them with contractual incentives to address the moral hazard problem associated with voluntary disclosures. JEL Classifications: M41.