The Structure of Commitment in Exchange

The Structure of Commitment in Exchange
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DOI:
10.1177/002224299505900107
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发表时间:
1995-01
影响因子:
12.9
通讯作者:
Gregory T. Gundlach;R. Achrol;J. Mentzer
Gregory T. Gundlach;R. Achrol;J. Mentzer
中科院分区:
管理学1区
文献类型:
--
作者:
Gregory T. Gundlach;R. Achrol;J. Mentzer

文献摘要

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承诺是成功的长期关系的重要组成部分。虽然双方在交换中的承诺可以为发展关系社会规范提供基础,但不成比例的承诺可能导致承诺较少的一方的机会主义。作者研究了交换中承诺投入的可信度和比例对发展关系社会规范、机会主义和长期承诺意图的影响。他们还调查了长期承诺意图的可信度、关系型社会规范和一个时期内的机会主义对承诺投入和后期长期承诺意图的纵向影响。行为模拟数据表明:(1)交换承诺的可信度与关系型社会规范的发展呈正相关,(2)与同一时间段的长期承诺意向呈正相关,(3)关系型社会规范可能受到机会主义行为的破坏,(4)一个时期内关系型社会规范的存在与承诺投入和后期的长期承诺意向呈正相关。
Commitment is an essential part of successful long-term relationships. Whereas commitments by both parties in an exchange can provide the foundation for development of relational social norms, disproportionate commitments can lead to opportunism by the less committed partner. The authors study the effect of the credibility and proportionality of commitment inputs in an exchange upon the development of relational social norms, opportunism, and long-term commitment intentions. They also investigate longitudinal effects of the credibility of long-term commitment intentions, relational social norms, and opportunism in one time period on commitment inputs and long-term commitment intentions in later periods. Data gathered from a behavioral simulation suggest that (1) the credibility of commitment inputs in exchange is positively related to the development of relational social norms, (2) and is positively related to long-term commitment intentions in the same time period, (3) relational social norms may be undermined by opportunistic conduct, and (4) the presence of relational social norms in one time period is positively related to commitment inputs and long-term commitment intentions in later periods.