Credit Attribution and Collaborative Work

Credit Attribution and Collaborative Work
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DOI:
10.2139/ssrn.3482088
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发表时间:
2019-11
期刊:
Economic Research Initiatives at Duke (ERID) Working Papers Series
影响因子:
--
通讯作者:
Saltuk Ozerturk;H. Yildirim
Saltuk Ozerturk;H. Yildirim
中科院分区:
其他
文献类型:
--
作者:
Saltuk Ozerturk;H. Yildirim

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我们研究了一个团队合作的动态模型,在这个模型中,公众根据对个人努力的看法将成功归功于自己。协作行为明显地取决于边际努力成本的形状,或者项目的“难度”。在独特的(内部)均衡中,高能力的合作者工作更少,因此在“容易”的项目中获得更低的信用和回报,而在“困难”的项目中则相反。尽管搭便车,但团队均衡可能涉及过度投资。社会效率要求对协作工作给予过多奖励,而对单独工作给予较少奖励。研究了团队合作的激励机制和努力监测对信用归因的影响。
We examine a dynamic model of teamwork in which the public attributes credit for success based on its perception of individual efforts. The collaborative behavior varies starkly depending on the shape of marginal effort cost, or project's "difficulty." In the unique (interior) equilibrium, higher ability collaborators work less and thus receive lower credit and payoff for "easy" projects, while the reverse holds for "difficult" projects. Despite free-riding, the team equilibrium may involve over-investment. Social efficiency requires over-rewarding collaborative work and under-rewarding solo work. The incentives to team up and the impact of effort monitoring on credit attribution are also investigated.