Should civil servants be restricted in wage bargaining? A mixed-duopoly approach ☆
Should civil servants be restricted in wage bargaining? A mixed-duopoly approach ☆
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DOI：
10.1016/j.jpubeco.2008.11.004
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发表时间：
2009-04
影响因子：
9.8
通讯作者：
J. Ishida;Noriaki Matsushima
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
J. Ishida;Noriaki Matsushima
是否应该允许公务员（公共部门的雇员）进行集体谈判？为了回答这个问题，我们构建了一个工会化的混合双寡头垄断模型，并考察了公共机构的监管框架，特别关注了对上市公司的工资监管。事实证明，工资管制会产生关键的福利影响，因为它会产生两种相反的战略效应：工资管制加剧了下游市场的竞争，同时放松了上游市场的竞争。总体的福利效应是模糊的，主要取决于企业之间产品的差异化程度。我们还表明，与普遍的看法相反，给予公务员集体谈判的权利不一定对他们有帮助，因为当他们被允许集体谈判时，他们往往会要求过高的工资。最后，我们简要讨论了一个新的视角，当工资是内生决定时，利润动机在公共机构中的作用。
Should civil servants (employees in the public sector) be allowed to bargain collectively? To answer this question, we construct a model of unionized mixed duopoly and examine the regulatory framework of public institutions, especially focusing on a wage regulation imposed on the public firm. The wage regulation turns out to yield critical welfare implications as it gives rise to two opposing strategic effects: the wage regulation intensifies downstream-market competition while it loosens upstream-market competition. The overall welfare effect is ambiguous, depending crucially on the degree of product differentiation between the firms. We also show that, in contrast to the popular belief, granting the right to bargain collectively to civil servants would not necessarily help them because they tend to demand excessively high wages when they are allowed to bargain collectively. Finally, we briefly discuss a new perspective on the role of profit motives in public institutions when the wages are determined endogenously.