Sanctions and rewards with a motivated agent
Sanctions and rewards with a motivated agent
复制标题
对积极主动的代理人的制裁和奖励
DOI：
10.1002/mde.3800
复制
发表时间：
2022
影响因子：
2.2
通讯作者：
Yahagi Ken
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Thomas;W. et al. (Eds.);Yahagi Ken
本文提供了一个简单的框架，用于确定委托人是否应该使用外部激励（即，奖励和制裁），当这种激励计划影响代理人的内在动机，从事使命，并讨论福利效应。我们表明，（a）当代理人需要参与使命，主要应该只使用制裁，产生过度的努力相对于社会有效的努力水平。然而，如果委托人必须考虑代理人的外部选择，（B）当奖励鼓励内在动机时，委托人应该只使用奖励，这也会产生过度的努力;（c）当奖励阻碍内在动机时，委托人应该同时使用奖励和制裁，导致努力不足。这些发现有助于在公共/私人组织管理实践和公共/私人改革方案中确定适当的胡萝卜加大棒战略。
This paper provides a simple framework for determining whether a principal should use external incentives (i.e., rewards and sanctions) when such incentive schemes affect an agent's intrinsic motivation to engage in a mission and discusses the welfare effects. We show that (a) when the agent needs to participate in the mission, the principal should use only sanctions, which generate excessive effort relative to the socially efficient effort level. However, if the principal must consider the agent's outside options and (b) when the reward encourages intrinsic motivation, the principal should use only rewards, which also generate excessive effort; and (c) when the reward discourages intrinsic motivation, the principal should use both rewards and sanctions, leading to insufficient effort. These findings are helpful for identifying appropriate carrot and stick strategies in public/private organization management practices and public/private reform programs.