A Comparison of Multiple-Unit All-Pay and Winner-Pay Auctions Under Incomplete Information
A Comparison of Multiple-Unit All-Pay and Winner-Pay Auctions Under Incomplete Information
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DOI：
10.1111/1468-2354.t01-1-00031
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发表时间：
2002-11
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Yaşar Barut;D. Kovenock;C. Noussair
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Yaşar Barut;D. Kovenock;C. Noussair
本文研究了当有多个单位出售时，独立私人价值、全额支付和赢家支付拍卖的性质。我们在一组23个实验会议中研究了投标行为、效率和收入。我们的数据表明，全付费拍卖和赢家付费拍卖在经验上是收入相等的，尽管两者的收入都高于风险中性的贝叶斯均衡。我们的证据还表明，赢家付费拍卖比全付费拍卖更有可能导致帕累托有效配置。
This article examines the properties of independent-private-value all-pay and winner-pay auctions when there are multiple units sold. We study bidding behavior, efficiency, and revenue in a set of 23 experimental sessions. Our data show that the all-pay auction and the winner-pay auction are empirically revenue equivalent, though both yield higher revenue than the risk neutral Bayesian equilibrium. Our evidence also suggests that the winner-pay auction is more likely to lead to a Pareto-efficient allocation than the all-pay auction.