The possibility of efficient provision of a public good in voluntary participation games
The possibility of efficient provision of a public good in voluntary participation games
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DOI：
10.1007/s00355-008-0329-5
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发表时间：
2009-06
影响因子：
0.9
通讯作者：
Ryusuke Shinohara
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Ryusuke Shinohara
在这项研究中，我们提供的条件，有效地提供一个公共产品的参与博弈中，可以提供一个非负整数数量的单位的公共产品。在这种情况下，在最多一个单位的公共产品可以提供，我们提供了改进的纳什均衡，代理商只选择一个纳什均衡与有效的分配，并提供充分条件的成本分摊规则，保证存在的纳什均衡与有效的分配。在一个多单位的公共产品的情况下，我们提供了一个必要和充分的条件，存在一个纳什均衡与有效的分配，并证明纳什均衡是不太可能支持有效的分配，如果参与的许多代理人是需要有效提供的公共产品的情况下，相同的代理人。
In this study, we provide the conditions for efficient provision of a public good in a participation game in which a non-negative integer number of units of the public good can be provided. In the case in which at most one unit of the public good can be provided, we provide refinements of Nash equilibria at which agents choose only a Nash equilibrium with an efficient allocation and provide sufficient conditions for cost-sharing rules that guarantee the existence of a Nash equilibrium with an efficient allocation. In the case of a multi-unit public good, we provide a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a Nash equilibrium with an efficient allocation and prove that Nash equilibria are less likely to support efficient allocations if the participation of many agents is needed for efficient provision of the public good in the case of identical agents.