Semantics of the minimal logic of quantum mechanics
Semantics of the minimal logic of quantum mechanics
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量子力学最小逻辑的语义
DOI:
10.1007/bf02120818
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发表时间:
1972
期刊:
影响因子:
--
通讯作者:
H. Dishkant
中科院分区:
文献类型:
--
作者:
H. Dishkant
Discussion. G is intended to be a collection of possible states of knowledge. Thus a particular T in G may be considered as a collection of physical facts known at a par? ticular time. The relation R represents the possible time succession. T* is intended to be any state of knowledge, which can come after T. The transition from T to T* is connected with fulfilling of an experiment. And we assume that it is a single ex? periment (quantum observation). That is, TRA means: if we now know T, it is possible that later, when an experiment will have fulfilled, we shall know A. For example T may be the knowledge that the electron is in the fixed volume V0. After this we may fulfil an experiment and determine that the energy of this electron is E0. Now T* is the knowledge that the electron was in the volume V0 and possesses the energy E0. Note, that by fulfilling an experiment we change both the state of knowledge and the object. Thus in our example we cannot say that T* contains a statement that the elec? tron is in the volume V0, because the uncontrolled interaction with the device by the energy measurement can reject the electron from the volume V0. The condition RO may be interpreted as follows: from the state of knowledge F we can always pass on to the same state T (if, for example, the previous experiment will be repeated). The condition Rl? may be interpreted as follows: if A is obtained from T as a result of an experiment, then it is possible to return from A to any state 21, which is" less uncertain55 than T. Here the expression" less uncertain55 means that from 21 one can get only to such a state Q, to which one can get also immediately from T. Note, that the transition from T to T** may be impossible despite that the both transitions: from T to T* and from T* to T**, are certainly possible. Roughly speak? ing, the state of knowledge cannot be changed too rapidly. We suppose, that r NX means: from the collection of facts T we may deduce the truth of X, or: T forces X. As we saw, the new facts may replace the old ones. The condition (*) may be interpreted as follows: the truth is what cannot be anni? hilated without restoration as a result of a single observation. Roughly speaking, only restorable changes of states of knowledge can happen, or: the truth is resto rable.An analogous semantical interpretation was proposed by Kripke [3] for the in? tuitionistic logic. In the intuitionistic model the relation R is subjected to the con? dition of transitivity, stronger than Rl. Here the transition from T to T** is always possible, or: the knowledge obtained in many steps of cognition may be obtained