The Effect of Repeated Play on Reputation Building: An Experimental Approach
The Effect of Repeated Play on Reputation Building: An Experimental Approach
复制标题
重复游戏对声誉建立的影响：一种实验方法
DOI：
10.1017/s0020818311000026
复制
发表时间：
2011
影响因子：
7.8
通讯作者：
Barbara F. Walter
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
D. Tingley;Barbara F. Walter
摘要重复玩耍对声誉的建立有什么影响？关于国际关系的文献，对于声誉是否、何时以及如何在国家间和国家内部冲突中发挥重要作用，仍然存在分歧。我们通过一系列激励性的实验室实验来考察声誉的建立。使用重复进入-威慑博弈的比较静力学，我们分离出建立声誉的激励应该如何随着进入者数量的变化而变化。我们发现，在我们的实验中，受试者通常会建立声誉，这些投资也会得到回报，但我们也发现，一些受试者并没有像我们的模型预测的那样，对建立声誉的激励做出反应。为了解释这一点，我们关注的是任何人群中可能存在的偏好和认知能力的异质性。我们的研究表明，理性选择的国际关系学者和那些使用更多基于心理学的解释的人比之前阐明的有更多的共同点。
Abstract What effect does repeated play have on reputation building? The literature on international relations remains divided on whether, when, and how reputation matters in both interstate and intrastate conflict. We examine reputation building through a series of incentivized laboratory experiments. Using comparative statics from a repeated entry-deterrence game, we isolate how incentives for reputation building should change as the number of entrants changes. We find that subjects in our experiments generally build reputations and that those investments pay off, but we also find that some subjects did not react to incentives to build reputation in ways our model had predicted. In order to explain this, we focus on the heterogeneity of preferences and cognitive abilities that may exist in any population. Our research suggests that rational-choice scholars of international relations and those using more psychologically based explanations have more common ground than previously articulated.