Optimal environmental policy for oligopolistic industries under intra-industry trade
Optimal environmental policy for oligopolistic industries under intra-industry trade
复制标题
产业内贸易下寡头垄断产业的最优环境政策
DOI：
10.1007/978-94-015-8642-9_4
复制
发表时间：
1996
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
K. Conrad
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
K. Conrad
保护环境一直对国际贸易产生影响。近年来，随着全球变暖和其他环境问题的增加，环境问题在贸易谈判中发挥了越来越大的作用。多边谈判环境规章尤其成问题，因为各国的优惠、收入水平或生产成本各不相同。此外，环境方面的考虑可以用来掩盖保护主义政策。[1]由于本国企业主要由本国居民所有，因此以损害外国企业利益为代价增加本国企业利润的政策对政策制定者具有吸引力。一些国家的国家政府考虑在其产业和贸易政策中列入诸如对清洁技术和产品的研发提供补贴、对减排活动提供补贴、或对排放征税并对排放税征收重税的投入（如煤炭）提供补贴等项目。这种一揽子手段的一个例子是德国的二氧化碳排放税，加上目前每吨硬煤260德国马克（150美元）的补贴。1985年，里根总统批准了一项25亿美元的五年计划，以寻找更清洁的燃煤方法，这是另一个例子。假设有两个国家，标记为本国和外国。所讨论的行业（如钢铁或化工）是同质产品双寡头垄断。每个国家都有一个商品生产者，他们像古诺双寡头一样相互作用。边际成本和消费者偏好的差异可以解释产业内贸易。如果各国政府征收排放税，这一政策可能会改变其公司的国际竞争力。因此，有理由期望各国政府在制定国家环境政策工具时采取战略行动。如果任何一套政策的市场均衡是非竞争性的，那么企业之间的相互作用就可以大大改变环境政策相互作用的方式。政策手段包括排放税、减排活动补贴和投入补贴。尤其是
Protecting the environment has always had implications for international trade. In recent years, as global warming and other environmental concerns have multiplied, environmental issues have played an increasing role in trade negotiations. Negotiating environmental regulations mutilaterally is especially problematic because of differences in preferences, in income levels or in production cost across countries. In addition, environmental considerations can be used to disguise protectionist policies. 1 Since firms located in their home countries are predominantly owned by its residents, policies that increase home firms' profits at the expense of foreign firms look attractive to policy-makers. National governments in a number of countries consider including in their arsenal of industry and trade policies such items as subsidies for R&D in cleaner technologies and products, subsidies for abatement activities, or taxes on emissions combined with subsidies for inputs heavily taxed by emission taxes (eg coal). An example for such a package of instruments would be a CO2 emission tax in Germany together with the present subsidy of DM 260 ($150) per ton of hard coal. The endorsement in 1985 by President Reagan of a $2.5 billion, 5-year effort to find cleaner methods of burning coal is another example. Assume that there are two countries, labelled home and foreign. The industry in question (eg steel or chemicals) is a homogeneous product duopoly. There is one producer of the good in each country, interacting as Cournot duopolists. Intra-industy trade is explained by differences in marginal cost and in consumer preferences. If national governments levy emission taxes, this policy might change the international competitiveness of their firms. Therefore, it is reasonable to expect that governments will act strategically when setting their national environmental policy instruments. If the market equilibrium for any given set of policies is non-competitive, the interactions among firms can significantly alter the way in which environmental policies interact. The policy instruments include emission taxes, subsidies for abatement activities, and input subsidies. Especially a combination of
动态与静态协调博弈：动态均衡结构和静态风险优势
DOI：
--
发表时间：
2023
期刊：
影响因子：
--
作者：
Hamanaka Shintaro;Jusoh Sufian;Toshiyuki Hirai;Cato Susumu;Tadashi Sekiguchi
通讯作者：
Tadashi Sekiguchi