Revenue Sharing as Compensation for Copyright Holders
Revenue Sharing as Compensation for Copyright Holders
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收入分享作为对版权所有者的补偿
DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.1694506
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发表时间：
2010
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Richard Watt
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Richard Watt
在绝大多数关于版权使用费经济学的文献中，假定版权保持器持有者的报酬是固定的，或者是相当于用户额外边际成本的报酬，或者两者兼而有之。然而，在现实世界中的一些重要情况下，版权所有者受到涉及收入分享的补偿计划的限制。也就是说，版权保持器将用户收入的一部分作为报酬。从本质上讲，报酬是对用户收入征收的一种税。本文分析了这样的薪酬机制，建立和分析最优税率，以及纳什均衡税率，将出现一个公平和无约束的讨价还价问题。第二种选择提供了一个可能对监管当局有用的利率。
In the vast majority of the literature on the economics of copyright royalties, it is assumed that the copyright holder is remunerated either by a fixed payment or by a payment that amounts to an additional marginal cost to the user, or both. However, in some significant instances in the real-world, copyright holders are constrained to a compensation scheme that involves revenue sharing. That is, the copyright holder takes as remuneration a part of the user’s revenue. In essence, the remuneration is set as a tax on the user’s revenue. This paper analyses such remuneration mechanisms, establishing and analysing the optimal tax rate, and also the Nash equilibrium tax rate that would emerge from a fair and unconstrained bargaining problem. The second option provids a rate that may be useful for regulatory authorities.