Minimal social cues in the dictator game
Minimal social cues in the dictator game
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DOI：
10.1016/j.joep.2009.02.002
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发表时间：
2009-06-01
影响因子：
3.5
通讯作者：
Kitayama, Shinobu
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Rigdon, Mary;Ishii, Keiko;Kitayama, Shinobu
给予他人是个人的代价，但会给接受者带来好处。这种利他行为在无关联的匿名个体之间的实验游戏中得到了很好的证明。给予者和接受者之间的社会距离，或者给予者和潜在旁观者之间的社会距离，也被认为与给予行为有关。本文报道了在独裁者博弈中操纵一个极弱的社会线索的实验结果。在他们做出决定之前，我们向独裁者提供一个简单的视觉刺激：三个点的“监视眼睛”配置，或者三个点的中性配置。注视的眼睛结构暗示着一张示意性的脸--这种刺激可以微弱地激活大脑的梭形面部区域。我们的研究结果表明，这样一个弱的社会线索确实增加了给予行为-即使在双盲协议-和这种行为的差异，在不同的治疗是完全由男性的独裁者行为的差异解释。(C)2009 Elsevier B. V.保留所有权利。
Giving to others is individually costly, yet generates benefits to the recipient. Such altruistic behavior has been well documented in experimental games between unrelated, anonymous individuals. Matters of social distance between giver and receiver, or between giver and a potential bystander, are also known to be relevant to giving behavior. This paper reports results of an experiment manipulating an extremely weak social cue in the dictator game. Prior to making their decision, we present dictators with a simple visual stimulus: either three dots in a "watching-eyes" configuration, or three dots in a neutral configuration. The watching-eyes configuration is suggestive of a schematic face - a stimuli that is known to weakly activate the fusiform face area of the brain. Our results demonstrate that such a weak social cue does increase giving behavior - even under a double-blind protocol - and this difference in behavior across treatments is entirely explained by differences in the dictator behavior of males. (C) 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.