A two-level differential game of international emissions trading
A two-level differential game of international emissions trading
复制标题
国际排放权交易的二级微分博弈
DOI：
10.1007/0-8176-4501-2_16
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发表时间：
2006
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
L. Viguier
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
A. Haurie;F. Moresino;L. Viguier
在本章中，我们提出了一个动态博弈论建模框架，该框架适用于在《京都议定书》协议结束时进行的国际气候变化谈判，如果大幅遏制碳排放的必要性得到确认。该模型由一组最优经济增长模型组成，这些模型对应于将成为谈判各方的不同国家群体。温室气体的排放被表示为经济生产过程的副产品。两种类型的资本（清洁资本和污染资本）可用于产生具有不同排放效应的经济效益。谈判应确定一套限定温室气体排放上限的配额，以满足对总排放量的长期限制。在每一个时刻，考虑到排放上限，一个国际排放交易系统被组织起来。为了实现自我执行，排放上限和经济增长路径必须满足非合作均衡条件。用数学方法描述了这种两级博弈结构，并给出了在耦合全局发射约束下均衡解必须满足的最优性条件。
In this chapter we propose a dynamic game-theoretic modeling framework for the international climate change negotiations that should take place at the end of the Kyoto Protocol agreement if the necessity to drastically curb carbon emissions is confirmed. The model is composed of a set of optimal economic growth models corresponding to the different groups of nations that will be parties in the negotiations. Emissions of greenhouse gases (GHGs) are represented as by-products of the economic production process. Two types of capital (clean vs. dirty) can be used to produce the economic good with different emissions effects. The negotiations should determine a set of allowances that define caps on GHG emissions such that a long-term constraint on total emissions is satisfied. At each instant of time, given the emissions caps, an international emissions trading system is organized. In order to be self-enforcing, the emissions caps and the economic growth paths have to satisfy a noncooperative equilibrium condition. We describe this two-level game structure mathematically and give the necessary optimality conditions that must be satisfied by the equilibrium solution under the coupled global emission constraint.