Facilitating efficient coordination in large groups: small incentive payments in nested groups
Facilitating efficient coordination in large groups: small incentive payments in nested groups
复制标题
促进大型群体的高效协调：嵌套群体中的小额奖励支付
DOI：
10.1007/s40881-020-00093-2
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发表时间：
2020
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Suzuki Kohei
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Mitani Yohei;Suzuki Kohei
大多数现实世界中的大型组织都包含多个较小的小组，例如公司内部的工作组。然而，这种嵌套的群体能用来减少较大群体中的协调失败吗？我们报告了一个多玩家Stag Hunt实验，在该实验中，我们将一个大组分成相互排斥的小组。如果在大或小团队层面上实现了有效的协调，我们提供不同的激励付款。我们设计的新奇之处在于，我们保持两次治疗之间的总支付金额不变。在我们的嵌套激励治疗中，我们将实现大群体协调的奖励减少少量，并将相同数额的奖励重新分配给成功的小群体协调。研究结果表明，在嵌套式群体结构中，特权小群体的激励性再分配促进了大群体的有效协调。
Most large real-world organizations contain multiple smaller groups, such as working groups within firms. However, can this sort of nested groups be used to alleviate coordination failures in the larger group? We report on a multi-player Stag Hunt experiment wherein we hierarchically structure a large group into mutually exclusive small groups. We offer varying incentive payments if efficient coordination is achieved at a large or small group level. The novelty of our design is that we hold the total payment size constant between treatments. In our nested incentive treatment, we reduce the reward for achieving large-group coordination by a small amount and reallocate the same amount to successful small-group coordination. The results reveal that incentive reallocations privileging small groups facilitate efficient large-group coordination in the nested group structure.