Strategic saving decisions in the infinite-horizon model
Strategic saving decisions in the infinite-horizon model
复制标题
无限视野模型中的战略节约决策
DOI：
10.1007/s00199-007-0273-0
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发表时间：
2008
期刊：
影响因子：
1.3
通讯作者：
G. Sorger
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
G. Sorger
我们研究了一种机制，防止长期的财富分配成为退化的拉姆齐-卡斯-库普曼斯模型时，家庭有不同的时间偏好率。这一机制是基于这样一种观察：当所有财富都由一个家庭拥有时，价格接受行为就不再合理。形式化这一观察，我们得到一个模型与一个独特的静态均衡，其中，取决于参数星座，任何数量的家庭可以拥有积极的资本存量。我们描述了这种均衡，并表明，例如，增加分散的时间偏好率在家庭之间的明确增加总产出。虽然主要的结果是从一个相当一般的生产函数类得出的，但我们用一个单独的章节来讨论柯布-道格拉斯技术的特殊情况，因为它的平衡条件特别简单。
We study a mechanism that prevents the long-run distribution of wealth from becoming degenerate in the Ramsey–Cass–Koopmans model when households have different time-preference rates. This mechanism is based on the observation that price-taking behavior is no longer justified when all wealth is owned by a single household. Formalizing this observation, we obtain a model with a unique stationary equilibrium in which, depending on the parameter constellation, any number of households can own positive stocks of capital. We characterize this equilibrium and show for example that an increase in the dispersion of the time-preference rates across households unambiguously increases aggregate output. Whereas the main results are derived for a rather general class of production functions, we devote a separate section to the special case of the Cobb–Douglas technology for which the equilibrium conditions are particularly simple.