On the incentive properties of multi-item auctions
On the incentive properties of multi-item auctions
复制标题
论多物品拍卖的激励性质
DOI：
10.1007/bf01243191
复制
发表时间：
1998
影响因子：
0.6
通讯作者：
M. Miyake
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
M. Miyake
在不可分割的物品市场中，买家最多消费一个物品，买家最优拍卖是Vickrey第二价格拍卖的多物品推广。如果最优拍卖被公式化为一个策略博弈，则众所周知，它满足良好的激励性质，即，诚实策略是纳什均衡、唯一完美均衡和优势策略均衡。对于这三个激励性质，证明了最优拍卖是满足这三个性质的最优拍卖。的唯一性的结果是在预算约束和非线性公用事业的一般设置。
In a market of indivisible objects where a buyer consumes at most one object, the buyer-optimal auction is a multi-item generalization of Vickrey's second-price auction. If the optimal auction is formulated as a strategic game, it is well-known that it satisfies good incentive properties, i.e., the honest strategy profile is a Nash equilibrium, a unique perfect equilibrium and a dominant strategy equilibrium. For each of the three incentive properties, it is shown that the optimal auction is auniqueauction satisfying the property. The uniqueness results are derived in a general setting with budget constraints and non-linear utilities.