Dumping and dynamic competition
Dumping and dynamic competition
复制标题
倾销和动态竞争
DOI：
10.1016/0022-1996(88)90053-0
复制
发表时间：
1988
影响因子：
3.3
通讯作者：
H. Gruenspecht
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
H. Gruenspecht
当当前的产出水平影响到未来的生产成本时，国内外利润最大化的企业可能会将价格设定在当前成本以下以获得经验。反倾销执法对外国竞争对手以低于成本的价格进行销售设置了障碍，改变了竞争的回报结构，改变了外国和国内公司的均衡决策。对有和没有反倾销规则的纳什均衡的比较表明，这些规则即使在事后似乎没有约束力的情况下也会改变市场结果。这种对反倾销执法的积极分析补充了先前考虑倾销动机的研究。
When the current output level affects future production costs, domestic and foreign profit-maximizing firms may set prices below current costs to gain experience. Antidumping enforcement, which poses a barrier to below-cost sales by foreign rivals, changes the payoff structure of competition and alters the equilibrium decisions of both foreign and domestic firms. A comparison of the Nash equilibria with and without antidumping rules shows that these rules change market outcomes even when they do not appear to be binding ex post. This positive analysis of antidumping enforcement complements previous studies that have considered the motivation for dumping.