Reducing Toxic Chemical Pollution in Response to Multiple Information Signals: The 33/50 Voluntary Program and Toxicity Disclosures

Reducing Toxic Chemical Pollution in Response to Multiple Information Signals: The 33/50 Voluntary Program and Toxicity Disclosures
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响应多种信息信号减少有毒化学污染:33/50 自愿计划和毒性披露

DOI:
10.1016/j.ecolecon.2017.10.010
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发表时间:
2018
影响因子:
7
通讯作者:
A. Prakash
A. Prakash
中科院分区:
经济学2区
文献类型:
--
作者:
P. Hoang;William H. McGuire;A. Prakash

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我们研究企业的反应,美国环境保护署(EPA)的信息为基础的干预措施。首先,美国环保署披露了《有毒物质释放清单》(TRI)中所列化学品的毒性信息。其次,它将17种TRI化学品纳入33/50自愿计划,并要求参与该计划的公司积极减少其总排放量。因此,企业面临着“双”信号:关注毒性最大的化学品和关注33/50目标化学品。我们使用一套新的工具来估计这些双信号对美国制造企业在33/50计划期间(1991-1995)和计划结束后(1996-2013)的化学品排放的因果影响。我们研究了33/50目标和非目标化学品的“原始”排放量(以磅为单位)和“加权”排放量(按毒性评分加权)。我们发现,33/50的计划参与者减少加权排放的33/50的目标化学品,没有影响的“原始”排放或非目标化学品。我们还发现,这些减少持续后,该计划于1995年结束。这些结果表明,企业不是无条件的绿色洗衣机或环境管家。相反,公司战略性地投入资源,以追求环境管理,同时考虑到来自其主要利益相关者(如EPA)的多种信号。
We study firms' responses to two US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) information-based interventions. First, the EPA disclosed toxicity information on the chemicals listed in the Toxics Release Inventory (TRI). Second, it grouped 17 of the TRI chemicals in the 33/50 voluntary program and challenged firms participating in this program to aggressively reduce their aggregate emissions. Firms therefore faced “twin” signals: focus on the most toxic chemicals, and focus on 33/50 targeted chemicals.We use a novel set of instruments to estimate the causal effects of these twin signals on chemical releases of U.S. manufacturing firms during the life of the 33/50 program (1991–1995), and after the program ended (1996–2013). We examine both “raw” emissions (in pounds) and “weighted” emissions (weighted by toxicity scores) of both 33/50-targeted and non-targeted chemicals. We find that 33/50 program participants reduced weighted emissions of 33/50-targeted chemicals only, with no effects on “raw” emissions or non-targeted chemicals. We also find that these reductions persisted after the program ended in 1995. These results suggest that firms are not unconditional greenwashers or environmental stewards. Rather, firms strategically invest resources to pursue environmental stewardship while taking into account multiple signals from their key stakeholders such as the EPA.