Extracting secret keys from integrated circuits
Extracting secret keys from integrated circuits
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DOI：
10.1109/tvlsi.2005.859470
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发表时间：
2005-10-01
影响因子：
2.8
通讯作者：
Devadas, S
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Lim, D;Lee, JW;Devadas, S
现代密码协议的前提是，只有经过授权的参与者才能获得密钥和访问信息系统。然而，已经设计了各种篡改方法来从诸如智能卡和自动取款机的条件访问系统中提取秘密密钥。基于仲裁器的物理不可克隆函数(PUF)利用制造工艺中跨集成电路(IC)的导线和晶体管的统计延迟变化来构建不可克隆密钥。我们在定制硅中制作了基于仲裁器的PUF，并研究了该方案的识别能力、可靠性和安全性。实验结果和理论研究表明，芯片间存在足够的变化量，使得每个IC能够在实际环境变化的范围内被安全可靠地识别，例如温度和电源电压。我们证明了基于仲裁器的PUF是可实现的，并且非常适合于构建例如需要抵抗物理攻击的钥匙卡。
Modern cryptographic protocols are based on the premise that only authorized participants can obtain secret keys and access to information systems. However, various kinds of tampering methods have been devised to extract secret keys from conditional access systems such as smartcards and ATMs. Arbiter-based physical unclonable functions (PUFs) exploit the statistical delay variation of wires and transistors across integrated circuits (ICs) in manufacturing processes to build unclonable secret keys. We fabricated arbiter-based, PUFs in custom silicon and investigated the identification capability, reliability, and security of this scheme. Experimental results and theoretical studies show that a sufficient amount of inter-chip variation exists to enable each IC to be identified securely and reliably over a practical range of environmental variations such as temperature and power supply voltage. We show that arbiter-based PUFs are realizable and well suited to build, for example, key-cards that need to be resistant to physical attacks.