Perfect reciprocity is the only evolutionarily stable strategy in the continuous iterated prisoner's dilemma
Perfect reciprocity is the only evolutionarily stable strategy in the continuous iterated prisoner's dilemma
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DOI：
10.1016/j.jtbi.2007.02.007
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发表时间：
2007-07-07
影响因子：
2
通讯作者：
Day, Troy
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Andre, Jean-Baptiste;Day, Troy
理论研究表明，当相互作用的个体具有正相关的表型时，合作倾向于进化。在本文中，我们探讨了社会伙伴之间的信息交换和行为灵活性导致这种相关性的情况。我们认为这个博弈是“连续迭代的囚徒困境”。在这个游戏中，个体表现出的合作水平，以及他们相互回应的能力，都是他们行为策略的两个方面。在这个博弈中，策略进化稳定的条件是退化的，因此早期的研究无法找到单个ESS。然而，详细的入侵分析和有限种群的进化研究表明，自然选择倾向于个体以完美镜像（即相关）的方式对对手的行为做出反应的策略。作为一个必然结果，社会互动的总体回报（即合作的数量）是最大化的，因为相关伙伴的夫妇有效地成为了选择的单位。(C) 2007 Elsevier Ltd.版权所有。
Theoretical studies have shown that cooperation tends to evolve when interacting individuals have positively correlated phenotypes. In the present article, we explore the situation where this correlation results from information exchange between social partners, and behavioral flexibility. We consider the game 'continuous iterated prisoner's dilemma'. The level of cooperation expressed by individuals in this game, together with their ability to respond to one another, both evolve as two aspects of their behavioral strategy. The conditions for a strategy to be evolutionarily stable in this game are degenerate, and earlier works were thus unable to find a single ESS. However, a detailed invasion analysis, together with the study of evolution in finite populations, reveals that natural selection favors strategies whereby individuals respond to their opponent's actions in a perfectly mirrored (i.e., correlated) fashion. As a corollary, the overall payoff of social interactions (i.e., the amount of cooperation) is maximized because couples of correlated partners effectively become the units of selection. (C) 2007 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.