First-price auctions on general preferenrce domains: axiomatic characterizations
First-price auctions on general preferenrce domains: axiomatic characterizations
复制标题
一般偏好领域的第一价格拍卖：公理特征
DOI：
10.1007/s40505-013-0001-9
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发表时间：
2013
影响因子：
0.3
通讯作者：
Takumi Kongo
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Tsuyoshi Adachi;Takumi Kongo
在具有一般偏好的单物品拍卖中，第一价格拍卖是公理化的。在本研究中，我们以帕累托效率、个人理性、福利匿名性、福利非支配性来描述一价拍卖。前三个属性满足第二价格拍卖。考虑到第二价格拍卖是防策略的这一众所周知的事实，第一价格拍卖和第二价格拍卖之间的明显区别可以归结为非专横和防策略之间的区别，这两者都是关于代理人策略行为的重要属性。在表征中，福利中的匿名性可以被无嫉妒性所取代，这也是与代理人之间的公平性相关的基本属性。此外，在我们的表征，每一个属性，帕累托效率，个人的理性，和非专横的福利，是独立的，和域上的第一价格拍卖的特点没有股权属性指定。通过加强非专横，我们的特点是第一价格拍卖的一个较弱的权益属性称为平等福利平等。
In a single-item auction with agents having general preferences, first-price auctions are axiomatically characterized. In this study, we characterize first-price auctions by Pareto efficiency, individual rationality, anonymity in welfare, and non-bossiness in welfare. The first three properties are satisfied by second-price auctions. Considering the well-known fact that second-price auctions are strategy-proof, a clear distinction between first- and second-price auctions is reducible to the difference between non-bossiness and strategy-proofness, both of which are important properties with respect to agents’ strategic behavior. In the characterization, anonymity in welfare can be replaced by envy-freeness, which is also a basic property related to equity among agents. Furthermore, in our characterization, each of the properties, Pareto efficiency, individual rationality, and non-bossiness in welfare, is independent, and domains on which first-price auctions are characterized without equity properties are specified. By strengthening non-bossiness, we characterize first-price auctions by a weaker equity property called equal welfare to equals.