Are More Able Managers Good Future Tellers? Learning from Japan
Are More Able Managers Good Future Tellers? Learning from Japan
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DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.3176576
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发表时间：
2019-02
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Souhei Ishida;Takuma Kochiyama;Akinobu Shuto
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Souhei Ishida;Takuma Kochiyama;Akinobu Shuto
Baik等人（2011）发现，在美国，高能力的管理者更有可能发布准确的管理收益预测。以管理层盈利预测被有效强制的日本为例，我们扩展了文献，探讨了（1）管理层能力和预测准确性之间的关系是否是美国披露制度所独有的，管理层预测是自愿的，以及（2）高能力的管理者如何提高他们的预测准确性。我们发现，管理能力与基于初始预测的预测误差呈负相关，这表明高能力的管理人员更有可能在财政年度开始时发布准确的预测。然后，我们发现，高能力的经理人不太可能修改他们的初始盈利预测，不太可能使用盈余管理，以提高他们的盈利预测的准确性。我们的研究结果表明，虽然高能力的管理者更有可能发布准确的初始管理预测，低能力的管理者更有可能修改他们的预测，并进行盈余管理，以减少他们的预测误差。
Abstract Baik et al. (2011) find that high-ability managers in the U.S. are more likely to issue accurate management earnings forecasts. Focusing on Japan, where management earnings forecasts are effectively mandated, we extend the literature by exploring (1) whether the relationship between managerial ability and forecast accuracy is unique to the U.S. disclosure system, where management forecasts are voluntary, and (2) how high-ability managers increase their forecast accuracy. We find that managerial ability is negatively associated with forecast errors based on initial forecasts, suggesting that high-ability managers are more likely to issue accurate forecasts at the beginning of the fiscal year. We then show that high-ability managers are less likely to revise their initial earnings forecasts and less likely to use earnings management to improve the accuracy of their earnings forecasts. Our findings show that, while high-ability managers are more likely to issue accurate initial management forecasts, low-ability managers are more likely to revise their forecasts and conduct earnings management to reduce their forecast errors.