Venture Capital Investments by IPO Underwriters: Certification, Alignment of Interest or Moral Hazard?
Venture Capital Investments by IPO Underwriters: Certification, Alignment of Interest or Moral Hazard?
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IPO承销商的风险投资：认证、利益一致还是道德风险？
DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.559105
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发表时间：
2004
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Ronald W. Masulis
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Xi Li;Ronald W. Masulis
本文研究了当承销商是风险资本投资者时的IPO定价问题，并检验了承销商股权对IPO承销和定价过程的影响的三个假设。我们发现，承销商的风险投资显著降低了IPO抑价，并且主承销商的结果更强。这一证据与承销商认证和承销商与发行人利益的改善一致。当IPO估值存在较大的不确定性时，抑价的下降幅度更大，这进一步支持了承销商认证效应。控制内禀效应并不改变我们的结论。最后，主承销商对IPO发行人的风险投资也降低了承销商的毛利差。总的来说，证据是一致的承销商认证的影响，并在较小程度上承销商发行人利益的影响和不一致的IPO利益冲突的影响。
We study IPO pricing when underwriters are venture capital investors in issuers and test three hypotheses concerning the effects of underwriter share ownership on the IPO underwriting and pricing processes. We find that venture investments by underwriters significantly reduce IPO underpricing; and the result is stronger for lead underwriters. This evidence is consistent with both underwriter certification and improved underwriter alignment of interests with issuers. The fall in underpricing is substantially greater when there is greater uncertainty about IPO valuation, which further supports the underwriter certification effect. Controlling for endogeneity effects does not change our conclusions. Finally, lead underwriter venture investment in IPO issuers also reduces underwriter gross spreads. Overall, the evidence is consistent with an underwriter certification effect and to a lesser degree an underwriter-issuer alignment of interest effect and inconsistent with an IPO conflict of interest effect.