Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu, and the Vietnam Decisions of 1965
Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu, and the Vietnam Decisions of 1965
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战争中的类比：朝鲜半岛、慕尼黑、奠边府和 1965 年越南决策
DOI：
10.2307/2167036
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发表时间：
1993
影响因子：
2.2
通讯作者：
Yuen Foong Khong
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Yuen Foong Khong
从第一次世界大战到沙漠风暴行动，美国的决策者们在考虑发动战争时一再援引“历史教训”。这些历史类比实际上是塑造政策，还是主要是政治辩护的工具？Yuen Foong Khong认为，领导者使用类比不仅是为了证明政策的合理性，也是为了执行对政治决策至关重要的特定认知和信息处理任务。Khong确定了这些任务是什么，并展示了如何用它们来解释美国干预越南的决定。根据对高级官员的采访和最近解密的文件，作者以先前研究所达不到的精确度证明，越南时代的三个最重要的类比--朝鲜、慕尼黑和奠边府--可以解释美国的越南选择。一个特殊的贡献是作者使用认知社会心理学来支持他关于人类如何类比的论点，并解释为什么决策者经常不好地使用类比。
From World War I to Operation Desert Storm, American policymakers have repeatedly invoked the "lessons of history" as they contemplated taking their nation to war. Do these historical analogies actually shape policy, or are they primarily tools of political justification? Yuen Foong Khong argues that leaders use analogies not merely to justify policies but also to perform specific cognitive and information-processing tasks essential to political decision-making. Khong identifies what these tasks are and shows how they can be used to explain the U.S. decision to intervene in Vietnam. Relying on interviews with senior officials and on recently declassified documents, the author demonstrates with a precision not attained by previous studies that the three most important analogies of the Vietnam era--Korea, Munich, and Dien Bien Phu--can account for America's Vietnam choices. A special contribution is the author's use of cognitive social psychology to support his argument about how humans analogize and to explain why policymakers often use analogies poorly.