Pricing Competition and Channel Coordination in the Tourism Supply Chain with Optional Tours
Pricing Competition and Channel Coordination in the Tourism Supply Chain with Optional Tours
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DOI：
10.5367/te.2013.0316
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发表时间：
2014-10
影响因子：
4.4
通讯作者：
Qiang Guo;Ye Shi;Junfeng Dong;Xiaolong Guo;C. Anderson
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Qiang Guo;Ye Shi;Junfeng Dong;Xiaolong Guo;C. Anderson
作者认为，旅游供应链，包括在源市场的旅游经营者和当地经营者在目的地。旅游产品由预先设计的图尔斯和可选的图尔斯组成。消费者对可选图尔斯的价格和可用性很敏感，表现为可选图尔斯的比例。作者分析了如何选择图尔斯的比例，预先设计的图尔斯影响每个球员的均衡决策给三个不同的消费者态度可选图尔斯。他们发现，当渠道协调一致，可选图尔斯的比例足够大时，当地运营商可能会降低佣金。为了抑制降低佣金的影响，作者引入了一种针对可选图尔斯的税收机制。提供了数字示例来说明可选图尔斯的定价影响。
The authors consider a tourism supply chain that consists of a tour operator in the source market and a local operator at the destination. The tour product is composed of predesigned tours and optional tours. Consumers are sensitive to the price and the availability of optional tours, represented as the ratio of optional tours. The authors analyse how the ratio of optional tours to predesigned tours affects each player's equilibrium decisions given three different consumer attitudes towards optional tours. They find that when the channel is coordinated and the ratio of optional tours is sufficiently large, the local operator may reduce commissions. To curb the impacts of lowering commissions, the authors introduce a tax mechanism aimed at optional tours. Numeral examples are provided to illustrate the pricing impacts of optional tours.