To share or not to share? (non-)violence, scarcity and resource access in Somali Region, Ethiopia
To share or not to share? (non-)violence, scarcity and resource access in Somali Region, Ethiopia
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发表时间：
2007
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通讯作者：
B. Korf
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作者：
A. Bogale;B. Korf
摘要 环境安全传统的学者们试图解释环境稀缺（或退化）与不同形式政治暴力的发生之间的联系，以及制度机制如何调节这些联系。这里的马尔萨斯陷阱不是一种直接的决定论关系，而是一种可能性，当环境稀缺与寻租和排斥的社会经济过程同时发生时，就会引发暴力斗争的成熟政治条件。这种对稀缺性作为因果机制的先验关注模糊了我们对为什么暴力在某些地方发生而在其他地方不发生的理解。因此，我们的研究策略有所不同：我们研究环境稀缺（由于干旱）和政治不稳定条件下资源使用者之间非暴力关系的案例，并研究地方机构在管理竞争性资源诉求方面的关键作用。我们的案例来自暴力频发的埃塞俄比亚索马里地区，分析了农牧民社区如何在干旱年份与入侵的牧民社区制定牧场资源共享安排，尽管这给他们的放牧资源带来了额外的压力。住户调查调查了农牧民社区中不同家庭（资产贫困家庭和富裕家庭）参与不同类型共享安排的决定因素。我们的研究结果表明，资源共享为资产匮乏的家庭提供了在干旱年份稳定和增强其资产基础的机会，从而激励与入侵牧民的合作关系，而不是冲突关系。
Abstract Scholars in the environmental security tradition have sought to explicate the links between environmental scarcity (or degradation) and the onset of different forms of political violence and how these are mediated by institutional mechanisms. The Malthusian trap here is not a direct deterministic relationship, but rather a possibility, where environmental scarcity when it coincides with socio-economic processes of rent-seeking and exclusion triggers political conditions ripe for violent struggles. This a priori attention to scarcity as causal mechanism blurs our understanding why violence occurs in some and does not in other places. Our research strategy is therefore different: we study a case of non-violent relations between resource users under conditions of environmental scarcity (due to drought) and political instability and look into the crucial role of local institutions in governing competing resource claims. Our case from the violence-prone Somali Region, Ethiopia analyses how agro-pastoralist communities develop sharing arrangements on pasture resources with intruding pastoralist communities in drought years, even though this places additional pressure on their grazing resource. A household survey investigates the determinants for different households in the agro-pastoralist community, asset-poor and wealthy ones, to enter into different types of sharing arrangements. Our findings suggest that resource sharing offers asset-poor households opportunities to stabilise and enhance their asset-base in drought years, providing incentives for cooperative rather than conflicting relations with intruding pastoralists.