MISTAKES ALLOW EVOLUTIONARY STABILITY IN THE REPEATED PRISONERS-DILEMMA GAME
MISTAKES ALLOW EVOLUTIONARY STABILITY IN THE REPEATED PRISONERS-DILEMMA GAME
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DOI：
10.1016/s0022-5193(89)80188-2
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发表时间：
1989-01-09
影响因子：
2
通讯作者：
BOYD, R
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
BOYD, R
重复囚徒困境博弈被广泛应用于互惠利他行为的演化分析。最近的研究表明，在重复囚徒困境中，没有一个纯策略是进化稳定的。在这里，我表明，如果总是有一些概率，个人会犯错误，那么一个纯策略可以是进化稳定的，只要它是“强完美均衡”对自己。为了成为一个相对于自身的强完美均衡，一个策略必须是在每一个可能的行为序列之后对自身的最佳反应。我证明了无条件背叛和一报还一达特的修正版本都具有这种性质。
The repeated prisoner''s dilemma game has been widely used in analyses of the evolution of reciprocal altruism. Recently it was shown that no pure strategy could be evolutionarily stable in the repeated prisoner''s dilemma. Here I show that if there is always some probability that individuals will make a mistake, then a pure strategy can be evolutionarily stable provided that it is "strong perfect equilibria" against itself. To be a strong perfect equilibrium against itself, a strategy must be the best response to itself after every possible sequence of behavior. I show that both unconditional defection and a modified version of tit-for-tat have this property.