Location decisions of a polluting firm and the time consistency of environmental policy
Location decisions of a polluting firm and the time consistency of environmental policy
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DOI：
10.1016/s0928-7655(02)00026-x
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发表时间：
2003-05-01
影响因子：
2.9
通讯作者：
Xepapadeas, A
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Petrakis, E;Xepapadeas, A
本文认为，位置决定的垄断者，谁面临的税收，其排放量在本国，在事后，即时间一致的，和事前，即预先承诺，环境政策。我们发现，垄断者将搬迁更经常在事后最优排放税。一个政府如果不能在事前承诺征收排放税，而是在减排努力做出选择后才确定其税收，就无法影响垄断者的选址决定，因为它不能在第一阶段承诺战略性地降低其税收水平。每当垄断者在两种政策制度下搬迁时，在事后排放税下的国内福利往往更高。否则，在政府承诺预先征收排放税的情况下，福利会更高。因此。政府对一项政策的承诺并不总是改善福利。(C)2002 Elsevier Science B.V.保留所有权利。
This paper considers location decisions of a monopolist, who faces a tax on its emissions in the home country, under ex post that is, time consistent, and ex ante, that is precommitment, environmental policies. We show that the monopolist will relocate more often under ex post optimal emission taxes. A government which cannot commit to an ex ante emission tax and sets its tax ex post after abatement effort has been chosen, is unable to affect the monopolist's location decision, because it cannot commit to strategically reduce its tax level in the first stage. Domestic welfare is often higher under ex post emission taxes whenever the monopolist relocates under both policy regimes. Otherwise, welfare is higher under government commitment to an ex ante emission tax level. Thus. government commitment to a policy is not always welfare improving. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.