The Economics of Cannibalization: A Duopoly in which Firms Supply Two Vertically Differentiated Products
The Economics of Cannibalization: A Duopoly in which Firms Supply Two Vertically Differentiated Products
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发表时间：
2013-02
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通讯作者：
R. Kitamura;Tetsuya Shinkai
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作者：
R. Kitamura;Tetsuya Shinkai
在本文中，我们考虑并提出了一种新的双寡头竞争模型，在该模型中，企业在同一市场生产和销售两种垂直差异化的产品。我们证明，如果消费者的品味上限足够高(不是那么高)，那么每个公司生产的高质量商品比低质量商品多(少)。此外，我们发现，两种商品之间质量差异的扩大会导致相互蚕食，从而使高质量的商品将劣质商品挡在市场之外。此外，我们还进行了福利分析。
In this paper, we consider and propose a new duopoly model of cannibalization in which firms produce and sell two vertically differentiated products in the same market. We show that each firm produces the high-quality good more (less) than the low-quality good if the upper limit of taste of consumers is sufficiently high(not so high). Further, we find that the increase in the difference in quality between two goods leads to cannibalization, such that the high-quality goods keep out the low-quality goods from the market. Furthermore, we conduct a welfare analysis.