Contagion of self-interested behavior: evidence from group dictator game experiments
Contagion of self-interested behavior: evidence from group dictator game experiments
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自利行为的传染：群体独裁者博弈实验的证据
DOI：
10.1111/geer.12077
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发表时间：
2016
影响因子：
1.1
通讯作者：
Ito=Ogawa=Suzuki=Takahashi=Takemoto
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
鈴木 明宏 ;高橋 広雅 ;竹本 亨;砂田洋志;倉本宜史・足立泰美・齊藤仁;鈴木明宏・高橋広雅・竹本亨;Yoshimi Adachi・Tomoki Kitamura;Ogawa=Suzuki=Takemoto=Takahashi;山田直夫;Yoshimi Adachi;Ito=Ogawa=Suzuki=Takahashi=Takemoto
我们研究了在实验性独裁者游戏中群体决策是如何影响他人关注行为的。特别是，我们评估迭代游戏的影响是否不同的群体和个人的决策，以及决策风格（个人或群体）的差异是否改变了社会身份的看法。我们对群体决策有两个发现。首先，在更换团队成员后重复游戏时，团队决策变得更加自私。第二，一个独裁者群体给同一所大学的一个接受群体的捐赠比给另一所大学的一个接受群体的捐赠要多。这些发现对个人决策来说并不正确。
We examine how group decision-making affects other-regarding behavior in experimental dictator games. In particular, we assess whether the effects of iterated games differ for group and individual decision-making and whether the difference in decision-making style (individual or group) changes the perception of social identity. We make two findings on group decision-making. First, group decisions become more selfish when repeating the game after changing group members. Second, a dictator group donates more to a recipient group at the same university than to a recipient group at a different university. These findings are not true for individual decision-making.