Mixed Oligopoly at Free Entry Markets
Mixed Oligopoly at Free Entry Markets
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DOI：
10.1007/s00712-004-0098-z
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发表时间：
2005-01
影响因子：
1.7
通讯作者：
Toshihiro Matsumura;O. Kanda
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Toshihiro Matsumura;O. Kanda
我们研究了一家上市公司和一家私营公司的混合市场中上市公司的最优行为。现有研究表明，当企业数量外生给定时，上市公司的福利最大化行为是次优的。我们允许私营企业自由进入，并发现，与企业数量固定的情况相反，在混合市场中，公共企业的福利最大化行为总是最优的。进一步，我们发现当且仅当上市公司赚取非负利润时，混合市场优于不涉及上市公司的纯市场。
We investigate the optimal behavior of a public firm in a mixed market involving private firms and one public firm. Existing works show that welfare-maximizing behavior by the public firm is suboptimal when the number of firms is given exogenously. We allow free entry of private firms and find that, in contrast to the case with the fixed number of firms, welfare-maximizing behavior by the public firm is always optimal in mixed markets. Furthermore, we find that mixed markets are better than pure markets involving no public firm if and only if the public firm earns nonnegative profits.