A Quasi-Presidential Premiership: Administering the Executive Summit in Spain
A Quasi-Presidential Premiership: Administering the Executive Summit in Spain
复制标题
准总统任期：主持西班牙行政峰会
DOI：
10.1007/978-1-349-62797-4_7
复制
发表时间：
2000
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
I. Molina
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
P. Heywood;I. Molina
西班牙缺乏稳定议会政府的经验，公民社会发展薄弱，传统上由强大的（通常是威权主义的）政府统治，并由一个历史悠久但不均衡的行政机构支持。政府首脑的地位，有一个正式的支持结构，在欧洲早期就已经确立，尽管在实践中，在20世纪30年代之前，一个严重干涉的君主制使总理（Presidente del Gobierno）2几乎没有真实的自治权或领导能力。此外，在佛朗哥独裁统治（1939- 1975年）的大部分时间里，国家元首和政府首脑的职位在制度上都体现在独裁者本人身上。西班牙1978年宪法在政府和首相的组成、职能和权力方面采用了西德的模式，并在1978年宪法中规定了政府的职能和权力。与意大利的例子相反，对民主的关注并没有导致一个强大的议会，可以作为政府内部权力集中的制衡力量;相反，新民主主义的制度设计是由避免重复第二共和国（1931- 1936）宪法缺陷的务实愿望驱动的，这种缺陷导致了政治不稳定并最终导致内战。因此，当代西班牙政府在立法方面享有很大的回旋余地（自己的法案优先于
Spain, which has limited experience of stable parliamentary government and has been marked by a weakly developed civil society, has traditionally been ruled by strong-often authoritarian-governments, supported by a long-established but uneven administrative apparatus. The position of head of government, with a formal support structure, was established early in European terms, though, in practice, before the 1930s a heavily interventionist monarchy left the prime minister (Presidente del Gobierno) 2 with little real autonomy or leadership capacity. Moreover, throughout most of the Franco dictatorship (1939-75), the positions of head of state and head of government were institutionally embodied in the person of the dictator himself. Only with the post-Franco transition to democracy was it possible to establish a parliamentary democracy with a strong government over which the prime minister exercises significant authority.Spain's 1978 Constitution adopted the (West) German model with respect to the formation, functioning and powers of the government and its prime minister. In contrast to the Italian example, concern for democracy did not lead to a strong parliament which could act as a counterweight to the concentration of power within the government; on the contrary, the institutional design of the new democracy was driven by the pragmatic desire to avoid repeating the constitutional shortcomings of the Second Republic (1931-6), which had given rise to political instability and ultimately civil war. Thus, the government in contemporary Spain enjoys extensive room for manoeuvre over legislation (priority of its own bills over those