Cournot duopoly and environmental R&D under regulator’s precommitment to an emissions tax
Cournot duopoly and environmental R&D under regulator’s precommitment to an emissions tax
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DOI：
10.1080/13504851.2015.1073831
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发表时间：
2016-03
影响因子：
1.6
通讯作者：
Yasunori Ouchida;Daisaku Goto
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Yasunori Ouchida;Daisaku Goto
摘要本研究考察了在监管机构预先承诺征收排放税的情况下，采用管道末端技术的古诺双寡头企业的环境研发（E-R&D）。在技术溢出效应下，政府总是倾向于电子研发卡特尔化而不是电子研发竞争。与早期的研究截然相反，环境研究合资企业卡特尔化不一定能使消费者剩余最大化，尽管这提供了私人和社会激励。
ABSTRACT This study examines the environmental R&D (E-R&D) of Cournot duopolists with end-of-pipe technology under a regulator’s precommitment to an emissions tax. Under technological spillover effect, the government invariably prefers E-R&D cartelization to E-R&D competition. Highly contrary to earlier studies, consumer surplus is not necessarily maximized by environmental research joint venture cartelization, although this offers private and social incentives.