An African Relational Environmentalism and Moral Considerability
An African Relational Environmentalism and Moral Considerability
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DOI：
10.5840/enviroethics20143615
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发表时间：
2014-03-01
影响因子：
0.3
通讯作者：
Behrens, Kevin Gary
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Behrens, Kevin Gary
有一种普遍的假设是，非洲的思想本质上是以人类为中心的，对环境伦理几乎没有贡献。与这一观点相反，非洲环保主义的前景可以在相信自然物体之间根本相互关联的信念中找到。在这一非洲观点上确立道义上可思性的是，实体是相互联系的生命网络的一部分。这一立场赋予所有生物、生物群体以及无生命的自然实体以道德地位。这一观点不仅看似合理，而且在理论上也很有吸引力。
There is a pervasive presumption that African thought is inherently anthropocentric and has little to contribute to environmental ethics. Against this view, a promising African environmentalism can be be found in a belief in a fundamental interrelatedness between natural objects. What establishes moral considerability on this African view is that entities are part of the interconnected web of life. This position accords moral standing to all living things, groups of living things, as well as inanimate natural entities. This view is not only plausible, but also theoretically appealing.