A polynomial-time method to find the sparsest unobservable attacks in power networks
A polynomial-time method to find the sparsest unobservable attacks in power networks
复制标题
寻找电力网络中最稀疏不可观测攻击的多项式时间方法
DOI：
--
复制
发表时间：
2016
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
H. Poor
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Yue Zhao;A. Goldsmith;H. Poor
研究了改变电网节点发电量和负荷的功率注入攻击。系统运营商采用相量测量单元（PMU）来检测这种物理攻击，而攻击者设计这种PMU网络无法观察到的攻击。模型中还考虑了注入功率不能改变的“不可变母线”。结果表明，在给定PMU位置的情况下，不可观测攻击的最小稀疏性具有概率为1的简单形式，即等式，其中等式定义为增广图的脆弱点连通度.构造性证明允许人们在多项式时间内找到整个稀疏不可观测攻击集。
Power injection attacks that alter generation and loads at buses in power networks are studied. The system operator employs Phasor Measurement Units (PMUs) to detect such physical attacks, while attackers devise attacks that are unobservable by such PMU networks. “Unalterable buses”, whose power injections cannot be changed, are also considered in our model. It is shown that, given the PMU locations, the minimum sparsity of unobservable attacks has a simple form with probability one, namely, equation, where equation is defined as the vulnerable vertex connectivity of an augmented graph. The constructive proof allows one to find the entire set of the sparsest unobservable attacks in polynomial time.
不可观测电力网络攻击的最小稀疏性
影响因子：
6.8
作者：
Zhao, Yue;Goldsmith, Andrea;Vincent Poor, H.
通讯作者：
Vincent Poor, H.