QE in the Future: The Central Bank’s Balance Sheet in a Fiscal Crisis
QE in the Future: The Central Bank’s Balance Sheet in a Fiscal Crisis
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未来的量化宽松：财政危机中央行的资产负债表
DOI：
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发表时间：
2016
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
R. Reis
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
R. Reis
对量化宽松（QE）的分析通常集中在最近的过去，研究在名义利率为零的金融危机期间政策的有效性。本文研究的是量化宽松政策在未来财政危机中的作用，模拟的情况是财政前景与稳定的通货膨胀和没有主权违约不一致。危机可以通过两个渠道降低福利，第一个是通过总需求和名义刚性，第二个是通过信贷收缩和金融市场混乱。管理中央银行资产负债表的规模和构成可以干预这些渠道，稳定通货膨胀和经济活动。量化宽松的力量来自于付息准备金是一种特殊的公共负债，既不能被货币也不能被政府债务所替代。
Analyses of quantitative easing (QE) typically focus on the recent past studying the policy’s effectiveness during a financial crisis when nominal interest rates are zero. This paper examines instead the usefulness of QE in a future fiscal crisis, modeled as a situation where the fiscal outlook is inconsistent with both stable inflation and no sovereign default. The crisis can lower welfare through two channels, the first via aggregate demand and nominal rigidities, and the second via contractions in credit and disruption in financial markets. Managing the size and composition of the central bank’s balance sheet can interfere with each of these channels, stabilizing inflation and economic activity. The power of QE comes from interest-paying reserves being a special public liability, neither substitutable by currency nor by government debt.