AI, Quantum Information, and External Semantic Realism: Searle's Observer-Relativity and Chinese Room, Revisited
AI, Quantum Information, and External Semantic Realism: Searle's Observer-Relativity and Chinese Room, Revisited
复制标题
人工智能、量子信息和外部语义现实主义：塞尔的观察者相对论和中文房间，重温
DOI：
10.1007/978-3-319-26485-1_8
复制
发表时间：
2016
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Y. Maruyama
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
K. Abe;Y. Giga;K. Shade;T. Suzuki;K. Abe;Y. Maruyama;K.Abe;Y. Maruyama;阿部健;Y. Maruyama;Y. Maruyama
在心灵哲学中，塞尔设计了两个关于人工智能不可能性的论证：中国房间论证和基于计算的相对论的论证。本文的目的是双重的：一方面，我旨在阐明量子相对论论证对泛计算主义，特别是多伊奇和劳埃德所倡导的量子信息宇宙观的意义;另一方面，本文旨在从逻辑哲学中的语义实在论之争的角度，对汉语房间之争和语言理解的本质进行新的阐释尤其是达米特的证实主义意义理论。在这样做的过程中，心灵哲学与逻辑哲学和语言哲学紧密交织在一起：智力可能是推理的能力，鉴于统计和符号AI之间的区别（康德术语中的“感性AI”和“理解AI”），逻辑哲学和语言哲学可以说是心灵哲学的一部分，涉及智力的符号领域（即，理解而不是感性的领域）。更具体地说，在文章的第一部分，我认为，泛计算主义不能保持塞尔的外部现实主义，然而，一个激进的（外部）反现实主义的立场，如惠勒的（“它从比特”），可能允许泛计算主义的可能性。塞尔的论证和模拟宇宙的无限回归悖论对泛计算主义和宇宙的量子信息观提出了挑战，导致我们提出了弱信息物理和强信息物理的概念（就像弱人工智能和强人工智能一样）。在第二部分中，我认为达米特的语言理解的表现原则使塞尔由于他的中国房间论证的性质而陷入语义实在论。因此，塞尔的立场必须是两种意义上的实在论，即它必须是外部语义实在论。最后，我集中在最近的事态发展的范畴量子力学，并讨论量子版本的中国房间的论点。所有这一切的基础是概念性的观点，即意义的二重性表现在不同的逻辑哲学，语言和心灵。
In philosophy of mind, Searle contrived two arguments on the impossibility of AI: the Chinese room argument and the one based upon the observer-relativity of computation. The aim of the present article is two-fold: on the one hand, I aim at elucidating implications of the observer-relativity argument to (ontic) pancomputationalism, in particular the quantum informational view of the universe as advocated by Deutsch and Lloyd; on the other, I aim at shedding new light on the Chinese room argument and the nature of linguistic understanding in view of the semantic realism debate in philosophy of logic and language, especially Dummett’s verificationist theory of meaning. In doing so, philosophy of mind turns out to be tightly intertwined with philosophy of logic and language: intelligence is presumably the capacity to reason, and in view of a distinction between statistical and symbolic AI (“AI of sensibility” and “AI of understanding” in Kantian terms), philosophy of logic and language is arguably the part of philosophy of mind that concerns the symbolic realm of intelligence (i.e., the realm of understanding rather than sensibility). More specifically, in the first part of the article, I argue that pancomputationalism cannot be maintained under Searle’s external realism; nevertheless, a radical (external) antirealist position, such as Wheeler’s (“It from Bit”), may allow for a possibility of pancomputationalism. The Searle’s argument and the infinite regress paradox of simulating the universe yield challenges to pancomputationalism and the quantum informational view of the universe, leading us to the concept of weak and strong information physics (just like weak and strong AI). In the second part, I argue that Dummett’s principle of manifestation on linguistic understanding commits Searle to semantic realism due to the nature of his Chinese room argument. Searle’s position must thus be realism in two senses, that is, it has to be external semantic realism. I finally focus upon recent developments of categorical quantum mechanics, and discuss a quantum version of the Chinese room argument. Underpinning all this is the conceptual view that the duality of meaning manifests in different philosophies of logic, language, and mind.