Consequentialism, Climate Harm and Individual Obligations
Consequentialism, Climate Harm and Individual Obligations
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后果主义、气候危害和个人义务
DOI：
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发表时间：
2015
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Charles Goodman
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Christopher Morgan;Charles Goodman
决定开车而不是散步来放松会造成伤害吗？特别是，这样一个决定所造成的额外碳排放是否会使任何人的情况变得更糟？最近，一些哲学家认为答案是否定的，并在此基础上继续声称，行为后果论不能为个人自愿减少排放提供道德理由。推理通常包括两个步骤。首先，单个排放物对天气的影响是微乎其微的：地球的气象系统如此之大，而单个排放物的规模如此之小，以至于单个排放物对天气的影响肯定是微乎其微的。其次，微不足道的影响在道德上是无关紧要的，因为没有人可能分辨出这种影响发生和不发生之间的区别。在本文中，我们将说明为什么这两个步骤都是错误的，因此为什么行动后果主义意味着我们每个人都有义务尽我们所能阻止破坏气候，包括避免，或者也许通过购买抵消，我们自己的个人奢侈的碳排放。
Does the decision to relax by taking a drive rather than by taking a walk cause harm? In particular, do the additional carbon emissions caused by such a decision make anyone worse off? Recently several philosophers have argued that the answer is no, and on this basis have gone on to claim that act-consequentialism cannot provide a moral reason for individuals to voluntarily reduce their emissions. The reasoning typically consists of two steps. First, the effect of individual emissions on the weather is miniscule: the planet’s meteorological system is so large, and the size of individual emissions so tiny, that whatever impact an individual emission has on the weather must be vanishingly small. Second, vanishingly small impacts aren’t morally relevant because no one could possibly tell the difference between such an impact occurring and it not occurring. In this paper, we show why both steps are mistaken, and hence why act-consequentialism implies that each of us has an individual obligation to do what we can to stop damaging the climate, including by refraining from, or perhaps by purchasing offsets against, our own individual luxury carbon emissions.