Hart-Mas-Colell implementation of the discounted Shapley value
Hart-Mas-Colell implementation of the discounted Shapley value
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贴现 Shapley 值的 Hart-Mas-Colell 实施
DOI：
10.1007/s11238-016-9536-1
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发表时间：
2016
影响因子：
0.8
通讯作者：
Tomohiko Kawamori
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
原田三千代;淺津嘉之;田中信之;中尾桂子;福岡寿美子;原田三千代;Tomohiko Kawamori
我们考虑了Shapley值贴现的一种实现。我们修改了Hart-Mas-Colell模型，使每个参与者都对未来的收益进行贴现，不仅提出分配，而且提出联盟。我们证明了Shapley折现值被修正对策的每个平稳子对策的完美均衡所支持，使得在每个子对策中，由所有主动参与者组成的联盟立即形成。我们还提供了这种静止子对策完美均衡存在的条件。
We consider an implementation of the discounted Shapley value. We modify the Hart–Mas-Colell model such that each player discounts future payoffs and proposes not only an allocation, but also a coalition. We show that the discounted Shapley value is supported by each stationary subgame perfect equilibrium of the modified game such that in each subgame, the coalition that consists of all active players immediately forms. We also provide conditions for such a stationary subgame perfect equilibrium to exist.