Unnatural selection of outside directors: Consequences of Japanese corporate governance reforms
Unnatural selection of outside directors: Consequences of Japanese corporate governance reforms
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外部董事的非自然选择：日本公司治理改革的后果
DOI：
10.1111/eufm.12361
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发表时间：
2022
影响因子：
2.2
通讯作者：
Kochiyama Takuma
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Ishida Souhei;Kochiyama Takuma
我们考察了日本上市公司如何增加外部董事的数量，以符合公司治理改革的要求。我们发现，改革后，前公司审计师(堪萨亚库)成为同一公司外部董事的案件数量有所增加。对于改革前外部董事不足的迄今不合规的公司来说，这一趋势更加明显。此外，任命公司审计师为外部董事的公司倾向于改变其公司结构，以维持现有做法并将合规成本降至最低。我们的发现表明，日本的改革增加了对外部董事的非自然选择。
We examine how Japanese listed companies increase the number of outside directors to comply with corporate governance reforms. We find that, after the reforms, there has been an increase in the number of cases in which former company auditors (kansayaku) become outside directors in the same company. This trend is more pronounced for hitherto noncompliant firms with insufficient outside directors before the reforms. Moreover, the firms appointing company auditors as outside directors tend to change their corporate structures to maintain existing practices and minimize compliance costs. Our findings imply that Japanese reforms have increased the unnatural selection of outside directors.